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Foreign Capital Inflows and Economic Well-being: A Statistical Analysis of 46
Sub-Saharan African Countries From 1995-2015
Abstract
Variation in the economic well-being among sub-Saharan African countries is among the highest of any
region in the world. This paper attempts to address this disparity by exploring the role of foreign capital
inflows. This project extends the concept of well-being beyond GDP growth, to include measures of
poverty and inequality. A multivariate regression analysis finds that the observed capital inflows have
significant effects on all three measurements of well-being. Findings suggest that the level of affluence of
the domestic population has significant effects on the ability of those populations to translate diaspora
remittances into improvements in well-being.
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Introduction
Between 2000 and 2010 Africa, as a continent, enjoyed a staggering average
annual real GDP growth rate of 5.4% a year.1 In contrast, the world average
annual growth in real GDP for the same period was 3.27%.2 Although this rate
slowed slightly after 2010, Africa’s growth still remained above the world
average. However, not all African countries shared equally in this growth. For
example, while Nigeria boasted an incredible 1125.85% growth in GDP from
2000 to 2014, Botswana achieved only 180.90%.3 Part of this discrepancy has
been explained by technicalities in the way GDP is calculated, however there still
remains vast interstate inequality.4 This massive disparity raises many questions.
While there is a significant body of research devoted to explaining this inequality,
relatively limited focus has been placed on understanding the role of diaspora
remittances in explaining these outcomes. This project will attempt to address this
gap in the literature by assessing what role remittances have played in subSaharan economies over the last twenty years. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
and official development assistance (ODA) are included as possible alternative
explanations for the variation that also represent injections of foreign capital into
SSA economies.5
Economic development in sub-Saharan Africa is a topic that has received
substantial attention in the literature. Some of the predominant theories attempting
to explain variation in economic growth range from colonialism, and the
subsequent institutions established, to levels of education and corruption. While
this project does not dispute the importance of such factors, it asserts that
workers’ remittances also play a significant role in explaining well-being. To give
some context, in 2013 remittances sent to developing countries equaled $413
billion, compared to only $135 billion sent in international development aid.6 This
1

Dominic Barton et al. "3 reasons things are looking up for African economies." World Economic
Forum. May 5, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2017.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/what-s-the-future-of-economic-growth-in-africa/.
2
GDP growth (annual %)." The World Bank. 2017. Accessed December 12, 2017.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2010&start=2000.
3
"World Development Indicators." World Development Indicators | DataBank. 2017. Accessed
December 11, 2017. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators.
4
Morten Jerven. "Research Note: Africa by numbers: Reviewing the database approach to
studying African economies." African Affairs 115, no. 459 (2016): 348.
5
Muhammad Azam, et Al. "Corruption, workers remittances, Fdi and economic growth in five
South and South East Asian countries: A panel data approach." Middle East Journal of Scientific
Research 15, no. 2 (2013): 184.
6
Dilip Ratha. October 2014. Accessed January 24, 2018.
https://www.ted.com/talks/dilip_ratha_the_
hidden_force_in_global_economics_sending_money_home.
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statistic alone shows the importance of understanding the impacts of this capital
inflow.
Remittances not only surpass the volume of development aid; there are
also many other good reasons to believe that they directly influence well-being at
the household level. The theoretical importance of remittances to household wellbeing is supported by findings from research on cash transfer programs.7 One
recent study from 2018 found that cash transfer programs in Zambia had a
positive long-term impact on standards of living.8 Remittances are another form
of cash transfer: putting money into the hands of poorer demographics.
This project will provide a brief background of the relevant historical and
economic context traditionally used to understand economic well-being and
development in sub-Saharan Africa. I begin with a discussion of the major
schools of thought which currently dominate the field of international
development, as well as a few more minor, but nevertheless, significant branches.
I will then further elaborate on the role that remittance payments have played
globally, and within Africa, and provide further justification for the assertion that
such payments are crucial to understanding development in the post-Cold War
world. This section will conclude with a discussion of the inadequacy of GDP
alone as a measure of well-being. It will propose additional alternative measures
which, together with GDP, provide a more holistic and accurate understanding of
human development.
This paper employs a panel series analysis to test the relationship between
capital flows—including remittances, ODA, and FDI—and three different
measures of well-being: economic growth, inequality, and poverty. This
methodology is the most appropriate for identifying the impacts of multiple
factors on a dependent variable over a significant time period. The analysis
includes countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1995 until 2015.
Finally, this paper will conclude with an analysis of the results, as well as
a discussion of recommendations. The discussion has implications for both
international and national economic and migration policies. FDI and ODA are
found to be largely insignificant factors, which suggests a rethinking of many
current development practices. Remittances on the other hand, are shown to
positively influence every one of the measures of well-being examined in this
paper. The migration implications in particular may prove controversial given the
current resurgence of protectionism and nationalism seen sweeping across the
globe.
7

Lia Fernald C H, Paul J. Gertler, and Lynnette M. Neufeld. "Role of Cash in Conditional Cash
Transfer Programmes for Child Health, Growth, and Development: An Analysis of Mexicos
Oportunidades." The Lancet 371, no. 9615 (2008): 828-37.
8
Handa Sudhanshu et al. "Can Unconditional Cash Transfers Raise Long-term Living Standards?
Evidence from Zambia." Journal of Development Economics 133 (July 2018): 42-65.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/5

2

Csanadi: Foreign Capital and Economic Well-being in sub-Saharan Africa

Review of the Literature
There are many competing theories seeking to explain the causes of economic
success or failure in developing countries. The first school of thought, which is
particularly relevant to sub-Saharan Africa, emphasizes the experience of
colonialism on development.9 One central argument in this school is that
geography led to the creation of different colonial systems, which in turn had
lasting impacts on the development of the nations that now occupy those same
locations.10 The next school, the economic institutionalists, asserts the primacy of
domestic institutions in explaining economic well-being, and is closely linked
with the colonial school. The argument in this school of thought is that fiscal,
judiciary, and political institutions, are the primary explanatory factor for
economic well-being.11 The third major school emphasizes the belief that trade
and trade barriers explain differential economic growth. The benefits of trade are
largely based on David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage.12
Some other discussions also consider the role of capital, both natural and
human. Natural capital has been shown to have both positive and negative effects
for economic growth due to the volatility in commodities prices that often
accompanies it.13 In addition to natural capital, human capital, in the form of
education, is also often cited in explaining growth patterns.14 The most obvious
way to increase human capital is through education. While the exact impact of
education on human capital is contested, there is evidence that higher education is
positively correlated with income growth, specifically among African countries.15
Daron Acemoglu et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation” The American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401. ; Daron Acemoglu et
al. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income
Distribution” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 no. 4 (November 2002): 1231-1294.
10
Acemoglu et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation” 1369.
11
Abdullahi D. Ahmed, and Abu N.m. Wahid. "Financial structure and economic growth link in
African countries: a panel cointegration analysis." Journal of Economic Studies 38, no. 3 (August
2011): 331-357. ; Rodrik et al. 135. ; Raju Singh et al. "Determinants and Macroeconomic Impact
of Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa." Journal of African Economies 20, no. 2 (October 25,
2010): 312-340.
12
Helena Norberg-Hodge. “Sustainable Economies-Local or Global? In The Future of
Sustainability, 99-115, 2006.
13
Frederick Van Der Ploeg, and Steven Poelhekke. "Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse."
Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 4 (2009): 727.
14
Thorvaldur Gylfason. "Natural resources, education, and economic development." European
Economic Review 45, no. 4-6 (May 2001): 847-859. ; Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong et al. "Higher
Education and Economic Growth in Africa." Journal of Development Studies 42, no. 3 (April
2006): 509-529. ; "World Development Report 1995." World Development Report, 1995.
15
Gyimah-Brempong, K., et al., 525.
9
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Finally, many have examined how FDI and ODA influence economic
well-being. Both FDI and ODA represent similar forms of capital inflows, and
despite a significant body of research showing that aid, on its own, is not
significant in explaining growth rates, there are still studies which support the
validity of ODA, and so it is included in the model below.16 FDI, on the other
hand, has been repeatedly shown to have a statistically significant impact on
growth, although the magnitude of the impact depends on many domestic and
international factors.17

The Effects of Colonialism
While the institution of colonialism has long been criticized for its effects on the
colonized economies, modern understanding of the extent of the significance of
colonialism on development in Africa began to truly be cemented in 2001 as a
result of the seminal work of Acemoglu et al.18 Their research used mortality rates
of European settlers to determine the nature of the institutions created during
colonialism. They found that areas with high mortality rates for European settlers
were more likely to experience extractive colonial institutions (a prime example
being the Belgian colony in Congo), whereas areas with low mortality rates
experienced constructive institutions (a prime example being the United States ).19
The reason for this is that in areas with high mortality rates, European settlers
were unwilling to invest in the establishment of fundamentally sound institutions.
Instead, they created extractive colonial institutions, which did not guarantee
protection of private property rights, or governmental checks on power, and were
designed primarily to transfer wealth out of the colony. Constructive institutions,
on the other hand, became “Neo-Europes,” which encouraged investment and
economic growth. Acemoglu et al. argue that the effects of these colonial
16

Craig Burnside and David Dollar. "Aid, Policies, and Growth ." American Economic Review 90,
no. 4 (September 2000): 847-868. ; Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp. "Aid and Growth Regression."
Journal of Development Economics 64, no. 2 (2001): 547-570.
17
Olawumi Awolusi, and Olufemi Adeyeye. "Foreign direct investment and economic growth in
Africa: A comparative analysis." International Journal of Sustainable Economy 9, no. 3 (2017):
183-198. ; Muhammad Azam, et Al. "Corruption, workers remittances, Fdi and economic growth
in five South and South East Asian countries: A panel data approach." Middle East Journal of
Scientific Research 15, no. 2 (2013): 184-190. ; Eduardo Borensztein et al. "How Does Foreign
Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?" Journal of International Economics 45 (May 20,
1997): 115-135. ; Robert Feenstra and Gordon Hanson. "Foreign Direct Investment and Relative
Wages: Evidence from Mexico's Maquiladoras." Journal of International Economics 42, no. 3
(May 1, 1997): 371-393. ;
Mullins and Mahabir. 243-261.
18
Acemoglu et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation” 1369-1401.
19
Ibid., 1370
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institutions continue to be felt in the present, although they are not necessarily
deterministic.20 Although Rodrik et al. in 2004 criticized this article for not
sufficiently incorporating the effects of trade into their models, their argument
remains a largely accepted explanation for differential economic outcomes.21
The impact of colonialism has since continued to be explored, and
scholars within this school have continued to elaborate on the original arguments.
For example, Acemoglu et al. expanded on their original study a year later, with
an article arguing that the experience of colonialism effectively reversed the status
of rich and poor areas that became colonies.22 They use urbanization and
population data to show that European colonizers were more likely to create
institutions that encouraged investment in relatively poorer countries, while
largely extracting the wealth of relatively richer countries.23 The article goes on to
argue that this reversal in relative wealth, and encouragement of investment
occurred in the late 18th century just in time for these areas to make full use of
industrialization.24 Rapid industrialization allowed some countries to expand their
wealth at unprecedented levels, further expanding the divide between richer and
poorer countries
Other significant work on the role of colonialism in development suggests
links between political affiliations and foreign aid payments, as well as the
survival of democratic institutions.25 For example, one study finds that an increase
in time spent as a colony has a strong correlation with the amount of foreign aid
sent by the colonizing country.26Another study suggests that the survival of
democracy can be explained by which European empire colonized the country.27
In summary, this group of scholars focuses primarily on the effects colonialism
and how they persist into the present.

20

Ibid.,1395
Rodrik et al. 135.
22
Acemoglu et al. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern
World Income Distribution” 1231-1294.
23
Ibid., 1231
24
Acemoglu et al. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern
World Income Distribution” 1256-1259.
25
Alberto Alesina, and David Dollar. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of
Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (March 2000): 33-63. ; Bernhard, et Al. "The Legacy of Western
Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March
2004): 225-250.
26
Alesina, and Dollar. 45.
27
Bernhard et al. 247
21
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The Role of Institutions
Many economists agree that domestic institutions play a role in explaining
variation in growth patterns. Institutionalist economists, however, argue that
institutions do not simply play a role, but rather are the most significant factor.
Though Acemoglu et al. would likely consider themselves as belonging to this
school, I separate them here to emphasize the distinction of colonialism for the
SSA region specifically. In effect the division becomes a matter of emphasis, with
colonialism pertaining particularly to the region being studied and thus warranting
a distinct category. Institutionalists as described in this paper, therefore, represent
the work of scholars who more generally focus on the role of domestic
institutions. The seminal work among this group comes from Rodrik et al.’s 2004
study which examined the role of institutions, trade, and geography on
development, and ultimately declared that institutions “trump” the other two as an
primary explanatory factor economic success.28 The core argument in their paper,
as well as in much of the work of other institutionalists, is that while many
combinations of factors impact growth—worker productivity, human capital,
natural resource capital, foreign inflows—institutional quality influences the
magnitude of these effects. In particular, studies show that the strength of
financial and banking systems is significant in explaining economic growth
among African nations.29 One study indicates that the quality of financial
institutions has an effect on productivity and efficiency, whereas banking systems
impact growth through their effect on capital accumulation.30
There are also those who challenge the causal nature of institutions on
growth.31 An often cited article by Glaeser et al. suggests that human capital is in
fact a more basic source for growth. From this perspective, countries achieve
growth as a result of good policies set by autocrats, and only then do these
countries revise and improve their institutions.32 This idea of the importance of
policy has also been challenged however, by studies that find that, controlling for
the effect of institutions, macroeconomic policy such as inflation rate targets and
deficit spending, had relatively minimal effects on explaining market volatility. 33

28

Rodrik, et al. 132-165.
Ahmed, and Wahid. 331-357.
30
Ibid., 331
31
Edward Glaeser et al. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 3
(September 2004): 271-303.
32
Ibid., 271
33
Acemoglu et al. "Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth."
Journal of Monetary Economics 50, no. 1 (January 2003): 49-123.
29
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Impacts of Trade
Trade was long the most often cited explanatory factor for development among
economists, but support for the trade-led hypothesis has dwindled. The seminal
piece of scholarship in this school of thought is Frankel and Romer’s 1999 article
which suggests a large, though only moderately significant, positive correlation
between trade and income growth.34 This article rejects the notion that the effects
of trade can be understood through correlation between trade and income because,
it argues, trade is not determined exogenously. The analysis instead adopts a
model based on geographic factors on the grounds that these factors are not
determined by policy or income levels, and they can only affect the wealth of
individuals by influencing the ways in which those individuals trade with those
around them.35 In effect, they use geography as an instrument to propagate and
facilitate trade. Their findings suggest that a 1% increase in trade relative to GDP
increases income per person by at least one half of a percent.36
A similar study conducted in 2018 however, found only a meager
correlation between bilateral trade openness in Africa and an increase in growth
after accounting for endogeneity. 37 The one exception is that trade with China has
been highly beneficial for resource rich countries with predominantly exportbased economies, as well as some non-landlocked countries. Another article from
2014 which used a Granger causality approach found no evidence for the tradeled growth hypothesis in a study of 21 African nations.38

Education and Human Capital
There is a constant debate in the world of economics over the impact of
investment in human capital versus physical capital. One study shows that for
African nations, an investment in human capital can be as much as three times as
effective as an investment in physical capital.39
Although the authors concede that this number is likely higher than the actual
return on investment vis-à-vis physical capital, it does appear that investment in
human capital is a worthwhile policy for many sub-Saharan countries. Another
study also finds investment in human capital to be a significant avenue for growth
34

Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer. 379-399.
Ibid, 394.
36
Frankel and Romer, 381.
37
Mullings et al. 243.
38
Kojo Menyah et al. "Financial development, trade openness and economic growth in African
countries: New insights from a panel causality approach." Economic Modeling 37 (February
2014): 386-394.
39
Gyimah-Brempong et al. 526.
35
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among African countries, but only when there exists a sufficient capital stock.40
This study finds that investment in physical capital is more impactful than in
education, but only because education is worth the most when it is paired with
advanced technology. Furthermore, there are researchers who argue that it is the
quality, rather than the quantity of education that is significant for development.41
Many in this camp argue that the push to increase the number of children
attending school has come at the cost of providing quality education; none of the
economists who believe in the primacy of human capital would argue that poor
education counts as human capital.

FDI and ODA
Foreign investment is commonly thought of as being beneficial for growth,
primarily for its ability to provide liquidity, but also for its role in facilitating
technology transfers. The same article from this year which found only limited
evidence in support of trade-led growth in Africa, did however, find strong
evidence that FDI has played an important role.42 The general logic in support of
FDI as impacting growth is twofold. First, FDI provides access to capital which
may not otherwise be available, both for small and large businesses in developing
countries. Second, along with the flow of capital comes the infusion of
technological advances and technical training that increases the human capital of
the receiving country, and therefore has a significant effect on growth. An often
cited study from Borensztein et al. provides evidence that FDI is indeed a source
of technology transfer, but also that the magnitude of the impact on growth
depends on the existing stock of human capital within the receiving country.43
Other studies suggest that the effectiveness of FDI alone is relatively
ambiguous, however countries with strong financial institutions seem to benefit
significantly from FDI.44
Unfortunately, for many African countries, the lack of strong financial institutions
may render the effects of FDI negligible, or at least minimal. A 2017 study of
South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Central African Republic found
generally limited effectiveness of FDI.45 In countries with slightly more
developed financial institutions the effects of FDI would likely be higher. For
40

Francis Teal. "Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa: A Review of Channels
and Interactions." Journal of African Economies 20, no. 3 (2011): 51-79.
41
EA. Hanusake. "Why Quality Matters for Education." Finance and Development 42, no. 2 (June
2005): 15-19.
42
Mullings et al. 256.
43
Borensztein et al. 115.
44
Laura Alfaro et al. "FDI and economic growth: the role of local financial markets." Journal of
International Economics 64 (2004): 89-112.
45
Awolusi, et al. 183-198.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/5

8

Csanadi: Foreign Capital and Economic Well-being in sub-Saharan Africa

example, over 50% of the rise in the wages of Mexico’s skilled labor force has
been attributed to FDI and the maquiladoras along their northern border with the
United States.46

The Case for Remittances
Studies have shown that another form of foreign capital inflows, remittances, are
negatively correlated with the percentage of the population living in poverty. 47 A
recent report from 2015 examining the impacts of foreign capital inflows suggests
that remittance inflows, in addition to FDI, may be growth encouraging.48 It is
from this scholarship, that I assert the importance of remittances in explaining
variations in economic growth. Although there are some general assumptions
about the nature and effects of remittances, there is an insufficient understanding
of the exact impact of remittances on growth rates. Remittances not only surpass
the volume of development aid; there are also many other good reasons to believe
that they directly influence household well-being. Remittance payments have
proven to be countercyclical, meaning that they increase in times of economic
hardship.49 Other forms of foreign capital inflows, such as FDI for example, are
much more quick to vanish at the first signs of economic downturn in a country.50
The stability of remittances enables households in developing economies to act
according to their long-term interests, such as pursuing higher education, without
the threat of having their lives reduced to financial turmoil at the first sign of a
recession. This would suggest that while remittances may have growth-inducing
qualities, they should also reduce poverty ratings as they provide purchasing
power to those who may not otherwise have a source of significant income.

Data and Method
This paper employs a multivariate regression analysis of 46 SAA Countries from
1995-2015. The dependent variables for this project are the three measures of
economic well-being, GDP growth, inequality and poverty (measured at three
thresholds), and the independent variables are the three types of capital inflows,
FDI, ODA and remittances each per capita. The log of the independent variables
46

Feenstra and Hanson, 371.
Richard Adams and John Page. "Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in
developing countries?" World Development 33, no. 10 (October 2005): 1645-1669.
48
Muhammad Azam, and L. Gavrilla. "Inward foreign capital flows and economic growth in
African countries." Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 10, no. 3 (March 1, 2015).
49
Ratha, Dillip. 2013. The Impact of Remittances on Economic and Poverty Reduction.
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 1
50
Ibid., 3
47
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was ultimately used in the final regressions in order to reduce the effects of
outliers skewing results. Inflation and unemployment are two of the main
macroeconomic indicators which can be influenced by domestic institutions, and
so they are controlled for. The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom
is used to control for the degree of financial and capital market liberalization,
which is again a measure of domestic institutions, but is also directly related to
trade. The Freedom House Index is used to control for the level of democratic
values of a country, which again is pertinent to the institutionalist school. Conflict
is controlled for simply because the presence of a large interstate or civil war
would have obvious consequences for well-being. Years of compulsory education
is also included to account for human capital formation, and natural resource
rents, which is the surplus value of natural capital minus the cost of extraction, is
used to control both for natural capital endowments, as well as some of the effects
of geography. Lastly net trade per capita is also included due to the arguments
made in the trade school of development. Colonialism is not specifically
operationalized because its effects should be entirely captured in the other
measures of macroeconomic well-being described above. The argument of the
Colonial school is that the experience of colonialism influenced the type of
institutions which developed, and it is these institutions in turn which affect wellbeing. Therefore, once those institutions are controlled for, through variables such
as the Freedom House and Heritage Foundation indices, colonialism is implicitly
controlled for as well. Table 1.1 summarizes the operationalized variables, how
they will be used in the regressions, and the data source used.
Variable

Type

Data Source

GDP Growth (annual %)

Dependent

World Bank (WDI)

Gini

Dependent

World Bank (WDI)

Poverty ratio at $5.50 (%)

Dependent

World Bank (WDI)

Poverty ratio at $3.20 (%)

Dependent

World Bank (WDI)

Poverty ratio at $1.90 (%)

Dependent

World Bank (WDI)

FDI (per capita)

Independent

World Bank (WDI)

ODA (per capita)

Independent

World Bank (WDI)

Remittances

Independent

World Bank (WDI)

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/5
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Inflation

Control

World Bank (WDI)

Unemployment (%)

Control

World Bank (WDI)

Index of Economic Freedom

Control

Heritage Foundation

Freedom Index

Control

Freedom House

Conflict

Control

UCDP/Prio

Compulsory Education Years

Control

World Bank (WDI)

Natural Resource Rents (per capita)

Control

World Bank (WDI)

Net Trade (per capita)

Control

World Bank (WDI)

Table 1.1 Summary of Operationalized Variables

The goal of the analysis is to explain the variation in economic well-being
among sub-Saharan African countries. It examines the effect of three distinct
types of capital inflows—FDI, ODA and diaspora remittances—on three major
components of economic well-being: GDP growth, inequality, and poverty.
While the literature commonly praises the effectiveness of FDI, recent
studies have shown that remittances may also be growth encouraging, and that
they may also be negatively correlated with the percentage of the population
living in poverty.51 The exact nature of this poverty alleviation has not yet been
identified however. It follows logically that some level of affluence would seem
to be necessary in order for migration to occur and thus enable the remittances in
the first place. Additionally, remittances are a highly regressive form of capital
transfer, and thus a significant percentage of initial principle is devoted to
processing fees. The following hypothesis is derived using this logic.
Ha1: Diaspora remittances will be negatively correlated with poverty, and
that relationship will be stronger when poverty is measured at a higher
threshold.
Expanding on this assumption that remittance inflows will favor citizens
who are relatively more affluent, as well as from existing literature which
suggests that ODA may be conditional upon UN voting patterns as well as a host
of other issues not related to political institutions or economic policy, the second
51

Adams and Page. 1668-1669.
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hypothesis is developed below.52 In addition to remittances and ODA, FDI has
also been shown to be positively correlated with inequality by way of increasing
labor wages in Mexican Maquiladoras.53 The primary point of consideration is
that all three forms of capital inflows should only benefit certain demographics,
leaving the rest of the population relatively worse off.
Ha2: Remittance inflows, ODA and FDI are all positively correlated with
inequality among Sub-Saharan African countries.
The last hypothesis stems primarily from the countercyclical nature of
remittances compared to FDI. As mentioned in the literature review section ODA
is not generally expected to be a statistically significant predictor of economic
growth, however FDI has been shown to be growth encouraging. In addition to
the stabilizing nature of a countercyclical access to liquidity, remittances will also
be an avenue for populations to finance their education, thus accelerating their
human capital formation.
Ha3: Diaspora remittances will have a greater impact on GDP growth than
FDI or ODA.
This study seeks to identify general relationships between capital inflows
and three measures of economic well-being in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, I
employ a panel series analysis of 47 countries from the years 1995-2015. A
regression is the most appropriate test for this project as, for each of my three
hypotheses I have a single dependent variable (poverty, inequality and growth
respectively), which can be expressed as interval-ratio data. The panel-series
aspect is necessary because of the repeated observations over time. Given that the
strength of statistical analysis is improved by the number of cases, and because
the project seeks to identify patterns across the entire region, as many subSaharan countries as possible are included. The only exceptions are due to data
constraints. This leaves the project with 46 countries, and data from every year
since 1995 up until 2015. There are intermittent gaps in the data for some
indicators, which is certainly not ideal, and may distort the findings to some
degree, however it does not constitute systematic misrepresentation. Given the
nature of the Gini index and poverty ratios, many countries only had data for
these indicators for a few of the years within the sample. Because these indicators
are slow to change over time, and because they appear to change in a predictably
linear fashion from the data that is available, the choice was made to interpolate
data for the missing values. This decision was justified by the fact that it added
hundreds of cases to the sample, increasing the accuracy of statistical tests
52

Alesina and Dollar. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of Economic
Growth 5, no. 1 (1998): 55.
53
Feenstra and Hanson. 391.
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without making unreasonable assumptions about the trends of change in variables
with missing data. After performing Hausman tests, the only regression which
met the necessary conditions for a random effects regression was for the Gini. The
other four regressions were performed with fixed effects.
The analysis begins in 1995 because it is the earliest year for which data
for all relevant indicators are available. The year 2015 is the terminal boundary
because more recent data are not available. Though data for sub-Saharan Africa
has been criticized for being incomplete and occasionally inaccurate, studies have
shown that data roughly 18 months removed are more accurate.54 As with any
statistical analysis, many intricacies will inevitably be lost. However, the goal of
this project is not to entirely explain why each individual country experiences
their currently levels of well-being, but rather to identify general patterns across
the region as a whole.

Analysis
This section will begin with an introduction to the findings. It will then move on
to a discussion of the results of the regressions as they pertain to the hypotheses,
and an explanation of the significant findings, as well as the possible
shortcomings. Next, it will discuss the theoretical implications of the findings, and
how they are relevant to the research identified in the literature review. Table 1.2
shows the descriptive statistics.
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

GDP Growth
(annual %)

1,170

4.258

8.653

-51.03

149.9

Gini

1,044

45.36

9.508

21.2

91.7

Poverty ratio at
$5.50 (%)

1,044

85.04

16.47

6.6

100

Poverty ratio at
$3.20 (%)

1,044

70.2

22.46

2.5

100

Poverty ratio at
$1.90 (%)

1,044

49.24

25.11

0

100

54

Jerven, Morten. "Research Note: Africa by numbers: Reviewing the database approach to
studying African economies." African Affairs 115, no. 459 (2016): 348. doi:10.1093/afraf/adw006.
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Inflation

1,086

75.89

1056.43

-35.83

24,411.03

Unemployment
(%)

1,149

9.613

7.61

.3

39.3

FDI (per capita)

1,215

75.41

296.95

-914

6944

ODA (per capita) 1,215

78.107

91.13

-14

928

Remittances

676

9.622

44.63

0

383.59

Heritage
Foundation
Index of
Economic
Freedom

832

53.77

8.002

21.4

77

Freedom House
Index

1,192

0.3355

.4723

0

1

Conflict

1,121

0.2024

.402

0

1

Compulsory
Education Years

703

7.837

1.848

4

12

Natural Resource 1,176
Rents (per
capita)

13.32

14.03

0

89.166

Net Trade (per
capita)

-100.47

361.72

-2727.409

2287.45

952

Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in the Analysis of Well-being

Pertaining to the hypotheses, the results are mixed, as is shown in figure
1.3, the summary table for all regression coefficients. For Ha1, I fail to reject the
null hypothesis; while remittances are negatively correlated with poverty at all
thresholds, that correlation is strongest at the lowest threshold ($1.90), shown in
Model 3, and diminishes as relative affluence increases (as seen in Models 4 and
then 5). This is the exact opposite of what I hypothesized. Moreover, all three of
these results are highly significant. While this result is not what I expected to find
initially, upon researching the role of cash transfers, the result is consistent with
previous findings. In general, as cash transfers make up a larger portion of an
individual's income (i.e. for relatively poorer populations holding the average
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amount of remittance transfer constant), they will have a greater effect on wellbeing.
Dependent Variable
GDP
Growth
Model

(1)

Gini

(2)

Poverty
ratio at
$5.50
(3)

Poverty
ratio at
$3.20
(4)

Poverty
ratio at
$1.90
(5)

Remittances

0.4969*

-.02656

-0.7799*** -1.901***

-2.806***

FDI

0.1826

0.5924**

-.4082

-0.0915

-0.5023

ODA

0.3942

0.269

0.4802

0.184

0.5636

Inflation

0.01

0.0869**

-0.0143

-0.387

-0.0533

Unemployment

-0.123

0.1593^

0.5483**

0.7626***

0.5708*

Heritage Index

-0.2815*** 0.0608

-0.1495*

-0.0368

0.204

Freedom House
Index

1.019

1.712**

-1.642**

-3.047***

-4.670***

Conflict

-0.2205

-1.310^

-0.2782

-0.3595

-1.433

Compulsory
Education

-4.006^

-0.5260**

-0.8893**

-0.9885**

-0.6378

Natural
Resource Rents

0.0481

-0.0778*

-0.0123

-0.0386

-0.1442^

Net Trade

-0.0002

-0.0018^

-0.0039**

-0.0054*

-0.0073**

Note: * ** *** denote significance at the 5% 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. ^
denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 1.3 Results from Multivariate Panel Analysis Predicting Well-being in Sub-Saharan African
Countries, 1995-2015

I also fail to reject the null hypothesis in regards to Ha2. While FDI and
ODA are correlated with an increase in the Gini coefficient (model 2), both
migrant remittances are negatively correlated (meaning they reduce inequality).
However, only the relationship for FDI is statistically significant. While this
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possible relationship with FDI and ODA and a rise in inequality may seem
inherently negative, that is not necessarily true. Economists often refer to what is
called the Kuznets curve for explaining such trends. The Kuznets curve is a bellshaped depiction of the rise and fall in inequality which accompanies quick
economic growth, and the eventual plateauing that follows. What this graph
represents is the fact that with periods of economic growth, there will be some
individuals who are better equipped to maximize their economic gain than others.
This does not mean, however, that all of the benefits of this economic gain are to
be had by only a small minority. Essentially, while some certainly benefit more,
all (or at least most) benefit some. In this way, FDI and ODA, though possibly
correlated with domestic inequality, do not necessarily lower standards of living,
and may in fact improve them. This interpretation is challenged by the fact that
neither FDI nor ODA were shown to be significantly correlated on their own with
GDP growth.
We are able to reject Ha3: diaspora remittances are statistically
significantly correlated with GDP growth, and this correlation is greater than that
between FDI or ODA and GDP growth. Moreover, the results for FDI and ODA
are not even statistically significant, meaning there may not be a relationship at
all. The primary mechanism through which remittances encourage growth is their
countercyclical nature. The safety net that the diaspora provides is unique to this
capital flow, and inherently reduces the negative effects of market volatility to
which both FDI and ODA are subject to varying degrees.
The results of this project suggest that diaspora remittances are a much
more effective form of private capital flow for stimulating economic well-being
than FDI. Remittances are shown to be strongly negatively correlated with
poverty, as well as simultaneously positively correlated with GDP growth. FDI
has a statistically significant relationship with only one variable, domestic
inequality, and this is a positive correlation. This finding contrasts with the
literature that has found significant, positive correlations between FDI and GDP
growth. This is likely a result of poorer quality of institutions for many subSaharan countries, which is a condition upon which many of the benefits of FDI
are often argued to be dependent. Additionally, ODA was not a significant
predictor of any of the measurements of economic well-being. This finding is in
line with the literature, which suggests that ODA is not effective in promoting
growth or combating poverty.

Conclusion
There are a number of ways in which this paper could be expanded upon by future
research. One of the more obvious is to illustrate the diminishing marginal returns
of remittances on poverty alleviation as relative affluence increases. This project
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identified the existence and direction of this trend, but makes no claims about the
size of incremental changes in output of poverty reduction at varying levels.
Accurately identifying such a measure would allow policymakers to have more
confidence about the exact effect of changes in policy designed to either increase
or decrease immigration.
Another avenue of future research is the exploration of these findings on a
country-by- country basis. Variation in the economics of sub-Saharan countries is
extreme, as the standard deviations for many variables in table 1.2 indicate. This
means that there are almost certainly countries near the higher or lower
boundaries of affluence wherein the generalizations made in this paper would
either not hold true or be even more pronounced. One suggestion for a project
designed to explore this variation would be the identification of three countries,
one relative affluent, one relatively poor, and one ‘middle-ground’ country which
could then be explored in accordance with the same model as developed in this
paper. This would allow future researchers to have a better idea of how these
capital flows impact different economies, and thus allow policy makers to more
informed decisions on a country by country basis.
However, when the research is ultimately expanded, it will inevitably have
implications for migration policy. The results from this paper suggest nothing but
positive effects on domestic well-being for migrant sender countries. The
controversy is far more likely to come from the recipient countries of these
migrants, either due to economic, or simply xenophobic concerns. Therefore, a
final avenue for future research would be to further examine the impact of the
economies of recipient countries according to the same measures of economic
well-being used in this paper.
A possible policy implication for developing countries would be to
institute a better framework for diaspora communities to remit. Currently
remittance payments are a highly regressive form of capital flow, which is largely
due to insufficient infrastructure being in place to facilitate transfers. This failure
in infrastructure is reflected in the fact that the African continent is the most
expensive area in the world to remit to.55 Countries seeking to reduce their
poverty rates are encouraged to fund public works which support infrastructure
that enables faster, more reliable transfer of liquidity from diasporas to domestic
populations. In a sense this recommendation supports an economic institutionalist
approach in that improvements in domestic institutions is posited to allow
developing countries to improve their well-being.

55

Dilip Ratha. October 2014. Accessed January 24, 2018.
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